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Aim: Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVH) are experienced as the “voices” of others 
(O-AVH) or self (S-AVH) in internal space/inside the head (IS-AVH) or external space 
(ES-AVH), and are considered to result from agency and spatial externalizations of inner 
speech. Both types of externalizations are conflated, and the relationship between these 
externalizations and AVH experiences is unclear. In this paper, I investigate the relationship 
between cognitive agency and spatial externalizations and between these externalizations 
and the types of AVH experience.
Method: Twenty-five patients with history of AVH and 24 matched healthy controls 
performed agency and spatial distinction tasks: distinction between self-generated (read) 
(S) sentences and other-generated (O) sentences, and between sentences read silently 
(experienced in internal space, IS) and sentences read aloud (experienced in external 
space, ES). Regression analyses between misattribution biases (S-O vs. IS-ES, and O-S 
vs. ES-IS) were obtained. t tests were used to compare misattribution biases between 
AVH subtypes (S-AVH vs. O-AVH, and IS-AVH vs. ES-AVH).
Results: Regressions suggest that agency distinction is independent from spatial 
distinction in both groups. O-AVH and S-AVH subgroups differed only with respect to 
S-O bias, and IS-AVH and ES-AVH subgroups differed only with respect to IS-ES bias.
Conclusion: These results suggest that agency and spatial externalizations of inner 
speech are independent at phenomenological and cognitive and levels; and that these 
externalizations are co-related across levels. I discuss the implications of these findings in 
the wider context of research on AVH and on the experience of self.
Keywords: hallucinations, psychosis, inner speech, the self, cognition
INTRODUCTION
Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVH), i.e. auditory perceptions of speech without corresponding 
external object (1) are symptoms of many psychiatric and medical illnesses (2). AVH are also 
encountered in over 5% of the general (non-clinical) population (3), and often alienate affected 
individuals; those who seek treatment generally find partial relief with current therapeutics (4).
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While the mechanisms of AVH remain elusive, research 
consistently implicated disordered language processes (5) and, in 
particular, disorders of generation of inner speech (inner verbal 
thoughts) (6). In health, inner speech is recognized as one’s own 
and experienced in internal space (inside the head). Although 
not invariably, subjects with AVH report hearing the “voices” of 
others and often experience these “voices” in external space—
hereafter, phenomenological agency and spatial externalizations, 
respectively (7, 8). From the perspective of inner speech 
generation disorder, these aspects of AVH experiences point to 
agency and spatial externalizations of inner verbal thoughts at 
a cognitive level. Consistently, neuropsychiatric research has 
shown evidence for both types of externalizations (9, 10).
Cognitive agency externalization was extensively investigated 
using source memory tasks to examine the distinction between 
self-related (S) and other-related (O) stimuli—S/O distinction. 
Different populations of hallucinating subjects were studied with 
various experimental designs and various types of stimuli, and the 
results were somewhat inconsistent. For example, some studies 
examined the distinction between self- and other-generated 
motor actions (non-speech stimuli) (11) while others examined 
the distinction between speech pre-recorded in one’s own voice 
and that pre-recorded in the voice of other (speech perception 
design) (12). Furthermore, with different experiments, studies 
examined the distinction between speech generated during the 
experiment by self or other (speech generation designs) (13–
18). While the results of these studies were inconsistent, meta-
analysis of studies up to 2012 suggests S–O misattribution in 
hallucinating subjects (9). However, if indeed AVH result from 
speech generation disorder, non-speech stimuli and speech 
perception experiments are sub-optimal for the evaluation of S/O 
distinction of speech relevant to AVH. Using a speech generation 
paradigm and addressing a number of limitations in prior 
studies, we have previously shown significant S–O, but not O–S, 
misattribution in patients with AVH (19). S–O misattribution, 
in our study, was not related to general distinction ability, 
confounds (such as medication doses), or illness severity; which 
suggests that cognitive inner speech agency externalization (S–O 
misattribution) is a trait deficit for AVH.
Cognitive spatial externalization received less attention. 
Research has examined the distinction between speech 
experienced in internal space (IS) and that experienced in 
external space (ES)—IS/ES distinction—in AVH; and, just as 
in S/O distinction experiments, speech perception and speech 
generation paradigms were used. In the former, subjects 
distinguished between speech delivered via headphones 
simulating IS perception and that simulating ES perception 
(20). In the latter, subjects distinguished between sentences they 
silently read (experienced in IS) and sentences they read aloud 
(experienced in ES) (10, 21, 22). All speech generation studies 
(10, 21, 22), unlike that of speech perception (20), reported 
IS/ES distinction impairment. Differences in the populations 
studied [schizophrenia patients (10, 21, 22) vs. healthy subjects 
prone to all types of hallucinations but not necessarily AVH 
(20)] might also contribute to the discrepancy. Furthermore, 
as argued above, speech generation paradigms might provide 
more accurate appraisal of speech disorders pertinent to AVH. 
In a study, we used a speech generation experiment and found 
both IS–ES and ES–IS misattributions that were not related to 
general recognition capacity, potential confounds, or clinical 
severity scores (10). These results suggest a trait deficit affecting 
the processes of the spatial localization of inner speech percepts 
in patients with AVH.
The above considerations suggest that AVH phenomenological 
agency and spatial externalities (hearing the “voices” of others 
in external space, respectively) result from cognitive agency 
and spatial externalizations of inner speech (S–O and IS–ES 
misattributions, respectively). However, just as other-attributed 
“voices” have been generally considered synonymous to “voices” 
experienced in external space, S/O and IS/ES misattributions 
have been conflated (20). Such understanding is inconsistent 
with historical conceptualization (23) and more recent evidence 
(24) of multiplicity of the domains of the experience of self. More 
importantly, it is inconsistent with phenomenological evidence 
indicating that AVH agency and spatial externalities are not 
ubiquitous or synonymous.
Research indicates that AVH are phenomenologically 
heterogeneous, and could be experienced as the “voices” of 
self (S-AVH) or other (O-AVH), in internal space (IS-AVH) 
or external space (ES-AVH) (7, 8, 25). Furthermore, using 
multidimensional scaling (MDS) (26), we have previously 
constructed a map of the phenomenological space of AVH 
based on co-occurrences between AVH phenomenological 
variables, and shown that agency (S or O) and spatial (IS or ES) 
experiences of AVH are independent dimensions (8). In other 
words, IS-AVH are not necessarily experienced as S-AVH; 
and, similarly, ES-AVH are not necessarily experienced as 
O-AVH. We hypothesized that these independent dimensions 
reflect independent underlying neural dysfunctions; and the 
“where” and “what” dual auditory pathways were subsequently 
suggested as candidates (27). It was also suggested that the above 
dimensionality reflects independent underlying cognitive 
deficits: subjective origin (self or non-self) and subjective 
source (inner space or outer space) (28). To date, there are 
no experimental evidence to evaluate these phenomenological 
implications. In the present study, I investigate the relationship 
between S/O agency distinction and IS/ES spatial distinction; 
and between the phenomenological and cognitive levels of 
agency and spatial externalizations.
METHODS
Human Subjects
Twenty-five patients (24 males and 1 female) schizophrenia/
schizoaffective patients with history of AVH, and 24 (23 
males, 1 female) healthy control subjects were included in 
this study. Patients were recruited at the psychiatry clinic at 
the VA Medical Center (Minneapolis, MN), and controls were 
recruited through flyers posted at the VA. The experimental 
protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Boards 
at both the VA Medical Center and the University of 
Minnesota; and subjects gave written informed consent before 
participation in this research. Patients and controls received a 
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diagnostic assessment using the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM IV (SCID) (29) as well as an assessment of premorbid 
intellectual functioning using the National Adult Reading 
Test (NART) (30). Hallucinations were evaluated using the 
computerized binary Scale of Auditory Speech Hallucinations 
(cbSASH) (31) to identify phenomenological subtypes of 
AVH based on the S, O, IS, and ES experiences of the “voices.” 
Patients were also evaluated with the Brief Psychiatric Rating 
Scale (BPRS) (32), the Scale for the Assessment of Negative 
Symptoms (SANS) (33), and the Scale for the Assessment 
of Positive Symptoms (SAPS) (34). Furthermore, the 
illness durations were obtained from records reviews, and 
chlorpromazine equivalent doses of antipsychotic medications 
were computed (35). Subjects had short training sessions 
right before data collection to familiarize themselves with the 
experimental tasks described below.
Experimental Tasks
Agency (S/O) distinction: the task was carried out in 6 
blocks of about 3 min duration each. Each block consisted 
of two sequential phases for presentation and testing. In the 
presentation phase, subjects alternately read aloud sentences 
that appeared on the computer screen for 3,500 ms or listened 
to sentences pre-recorded in a neutral tone in the voice of 
another while the screen remained blank. The gender of the 
voice of the heard sentences matched that of the subject. Five 
read and five heard sentences were presented in random order 
in each block. In the testing phase, these ten sentences were 
mixed with five new sentences and visually presented on the 
computer screen one at a time in random order. Subjects 
were instructed to determine the source (agency) of the 
sentence: read = self-generated (S), heard = other-generated 
(O), or new = no agency coding (NC). The test sentences 
remained on the screen until responses were made. This task 
previously demonstrated significant S–O misattributions in 
schizophrenia patients (19).
Spatial (IS/ES) distinction: The experiment was also 
carried out in 6 blocks, and each block consisted of sequential 
presentation and test phases. The presentation phase consisted 
of two parts. In one part, subjects read aloud five sentences 
appearing on the computer screen one at a time. In the other 
part, subjects read silently five sentences similarly presented. 
Each sentence remained on the screen for 3,500 ms, and the 
two parts were presented in random orders across blocks. 
During testing, these ten sentences were mixed with five new 
sentences and visually presented one at a time in a random 
order. Subjects were instructed to distinguish between the 
three types of sentences: read silently = experienced in IS, read 
aloud = experienced in ES, or new = not spatially coded (NC). 
The test sentences remained on the screen until responses 
were made. This task previously demonstrated both IS–ES 
and ES–IS misattributions in schizophrenia patients (10). 
Figure 1 outlines both tasks.
The sentences were chosen from magazines in the patient 
waiting room in the clinic. On average, the sentences were five-
words long, had neutral affective content, and belonged to general 
categories such as sports and daily living. They were written 
in the first-, second-, and third-person with equal probability. 
Both procedures were programmed using E-prime (Psychology 
Software Tool, Pittsburgh, PA) coding for correct and actual 
responses, which allows for computation of response accuracy as 
well as error types.
Both tasks are based on a standard psycholinguistic 
procedure (reading) to evaluate speech (36). While social 
speech is different from inner speech, reading is a practical 
laboratory procedure to evaluate inner speech as both inner 
speech and social speech share a common developmental 
precursor (37, 38) and, to some extent, common neural 
resources (6). In particular, reading in the experimental design 
described above allows the investigation aspects of verbal 
thoughts implicated in AVH—agency and spatial experiences. 
Furthermore, as both tasks were similarly designed, both 
are likely to call upon similar cognitive resources other than 
those involving S/O and IS/ES distinctions. Accordingly, the 
relationships between S/O and IS/ES distinction operations 
could be examined by comparing task performances.
ANALYSES
All analyses were carried out with SPSS Version 24 (IBM SPSS; 
Armonk, New York) and included the following:
Characteristics of the Experimental 
Samples
Independent samples t tests were used to examine group differences 
with respect to potential confounding factors including age, 
personal and parental levels of education and premorbid 
intellectual functioning.
Group Differences in Agency and Spatial 
Distinction Capacities
t tests were used to examine the group differences in the percent 
of correct recognition of sentences that were agency (S or O) 
coded—agency distinction capacity—and spatially (IS or ES) 
coded—spatial distinction capacity. t tests were also used to 
examine group differences in the percent of correct recognition 
of sentences that were NOT agency or spatially coded (NC), 
which reflects general recognition capacity independently from 
agency and spatial distinction capacity.
The Relationship Between Agency  
and Spatial Distinction Capacities
These analyses were carried out with two methods. In the first 
method, error scores for the following types of misattribution 
errors were first computed: S–O (read sentences recognized 
as heard), O–S (heard sentences recognized as read), IS–
ES (sentences read silently recognized as read aloud), 
ES–IS (sentences read aloud recognized as read silently). 
Subsequently, linear regression analyses were carried out 
between S–O errors and IS–ES errors, and between O–S 
errors and ES–IS errors, with S–O and O–S errors as the 
dependent variables and IS–ES and ES–IS as the explanatory 
Agency and Spatial Externalizations in HallucinationsStephane
4 September 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 668Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org
variables, respectively. Group interaction term was included 
in both regressions. Given the similarity of experimental 
designs of the S/O and IS/ES distinction tasks, it is likely that, 
other than S/O and IS/ES distinctions, both tasks call upon 
largely similar memory and cognitive capacities. Therefore, a 
lack of relationship between these errors would point to the 
independence of the operations of S/O and IS/ES distinction, 
rather than to differences in memory and/or cognitive capacities.
With the second method, we considered the possibility that 
the two tasks differ in cognitive and memory requirements, in 
which case error scores comparisons would not accurately reflect 
the comparison of the operations of S/O and IS/ES distinction. 
To address this possibility, we obtained measures of S–O, O–S, 
IS–ES and ES–IS misattribution bias that are independent of 
memory and cognitive capacities. For this purpose, we computed 
the ratio of the misattribution errors of interest to all other type 
of errors in each task. For example:
S–O misattribution bias = S–O errors/S–O errors + S–N 
errors + O–S errors + O–N errors + N–S errors + N–O errors.
Where S–O, S–O are as defined above, and S–N = 
sentences read recognized as new, O–N = sentences heard 
recognized as new, and N–S, N–O errors = new sentences 
recognized as read or heard, respectively. Whereas S–O and 
O–S errors depends on both agency distinction failures as 
well as memory failures; S–N, O–N, and N–S, N–O errors 
only reflect memory failures. Accordingly, the ratio provides 
specific measure of externalizations and internalizations biases 
(agency externalization in the above example). Subsequently, 
linear regression analyses were carried out between S–O and 
IS–ES misattribution biases and between O–S and ES–IS 
misattribution biases, as in the first method.
The Relationships Between Agency  
and Spatial Experiences of AVH
The following subgroups of patients were first defined based 
on the agency (S or O) and spatial (IS or ES) experiences of 
AVH as evaluated by the cbSASH: S-AVH, O-AVH, IS-AVH 
and ES-AVH. The cbSASH showed that AVH were experienced 
as the “voices” of Self (2 patients), Self or Other alternately (6 
patients) and Other (16 patients). As those who experience 
AVH as either their own voice or that of others are likely to 
have a degree of integrity of the self-agency, the first two types 
of AVH experiences were combined in the S-AVH subgroup. 
With respect to phenomenological spatial externalization, the 
cbSASH showed that AVH were experienced in IS (9 patients), 
in ES (5 patients) and alternately in IS or ES (7 patients). 
Three patients were not sure about the spatial location of 
their “voices.” As those with alternate IS and ES experience of 
AVH are likely to have a degree of phenomenological spatial 
externalizations, the latter two types of spatial experience 
of AVH were combined in the ES-AVH. Subsequently, the 
relationship between phenomenological agency and spatial 
experiences was examined using chi square test.
FIGURE 1 | Outlines of the self/other (S/O)—blue rectangles—and internal space/external space (IS/ES) distinction tasks—red rectangles. In the S/O task during 
the presentation phase, subjects alternately read aloud (RA) sentences appearing on the screen and heard (H) pre-recorded sentences played back while the screen 
remained blank. In the testing phase, the RA and H sentences were visually presented along with new (N) sentences one a time in random orders. Subjects were 
instructed to identify through button press the sentence type: RA, H or N. The IS/ES task followed the same general design. However, in the presentation phase, 
subjects instead alternately read aloud (RA) and read silently (RS) sentences visually presented on the screen. In the testing phase, the RA and RS sentences were 
visually presented along with new sentences (N), and subjects were instructed to identify the sentence type: RA, RS or N. 
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The Relationships Between the 
Phenomenological and Cognitive Levels of 
Agency and Spatial Externalizations
Independent samples t tests were used to compare the S-AVH 
and O-AVH subgroups with respect the theoretically related 
measures of cognitive agency distinction failure (S–O and 
O–S misattribution biases) and with respect to theoretically 
unrelated cognitive spatial distinction failures (IS–ES and ES–IS 
misattribution biases) as control conditions. Similarly, IS-AVH 
and ES-AVH subgroups were compared with respect to cognitive 
spatial distinction failures (condition of interest) and cognitive 
agency distinction failures (control condition.)
RESULTS
Characteristics of the Samples
Table 1 summarizes the demographic variables of the two groups. 
There were no significant differences in age, personal level of 
education, or mean parental level of education. However, the 
two groups differed in their performance on the NART (patients, 
100.2 ± 8.3; controls, 108.5 ± 7.3, p < 0.001). In the patient group, 
the mean scores on the BPRS, SANS, and SAPS were (44 ± 10), 
(8 ± 4), and (8.7 ± 4.5), respectively. The mean duration of illness 
was (23 ± 12) years, and the mean chlorpromazine equivalent 
dose of medication was (314 ± 187) mg.
Group Differences in Agency and  
Spatial Distinction Capacities
Patients significantly differed from controls in the percent of 
correct recognition of agency (S/O) coded sentences p < 0.02 
and the percent of recognition of spatially coded sentences 
p < 0.03, multiple comparisons corrected (39). The percent 
of correct recognition of sentences that were not agency or 
spatially coded did not differentiate groups p > 0.74. These 
results are consistent with our previous work (10, 19) where 
these questions were comprehensively investigated, and suggest 
specific impairment in agency and spatial distinction capacities 
in AVH. Table 2 outlines the findings.
The Relationship Between Agency  
and Spatial Distinction Capacities
As expected, regression analyses using error scores showed 
that the null hypothesis of independent agency externalization 
(O–S errors) and spatial externalization (IS–ES errors) could 
not be rejected (P > 0.9). Similarly, there was no relationship 
between agency internalization (O–S errors) and spatial 
internalization (ES–IS errors) (p > 0.8). Group interactions 
were negative in both regressions at a P > 0.9 and P > 0.8, 
respectively (Table 3A, Figure 2) Accordingly, additional 
regression analyses to account for potential confounding 
factors related to group differences (the NART, BPRS, SANS, 
and SAPS scores, and the estimates of duration of illness and 
of chlorpromazine equivalent doses of medications) were not 
carried out.
Regression analyses with estimates of misattribution biases 
were consistent with those with misattribution errors described 
above. Regressions between S–O bias and IS–ES bias and 
between O–S bias and ES–IS bias were both insignificant with 
a p > 0.57 and p > 0.55, respectively. Group interaction effects 
were also not significant in both regressions with a p > 0.4 
and p > 0.3, respectively. Accordingly potential group-related 
confounding factors were not tested. Table 3B and Figure 3 
illustrate these findings.
The Relationships Between Agency  
and Spatial Experiences of AVH
Consistent with our previous work (8), chi square between agency 
(S-AVH, O-AVH) and spatial (IS-AVH, ES-AVH) experiences 
of AVH was insignificant (1.180, df 1, P > 0.28) suggesting the 
independence of these experiences of AVH. Interestingly, S-AVH 
were more than twice as frequent to be experienced in ES than 
in IS (Table 4).
The Relationship Between the 
Phenomenological and Cognitive Levels of 
Externalizations
Patients with phenomenological agency externalization 
(O-AVH) showed significantly higher S–O, but not O–S, 
misattribution bias than those without phenomenological 
agency externalization (S-AVH) p < 0.04 (Table 5, Figure 4A) 
Furthermore, control variables (IS–ES and ES–IS misattribution 
biases) were not significantly different.
Similarly, patient with phenomenological spatial 
externalization (ES-AVH) showed significantly higher IS–
ES, but not ES–IS, misattribution bias than those without 
phenomenological spatial externalization (IS-AVH) p < 0.05 
TABLE 1 | Mean and standard deviation of age, parental level of education 
(Parents Ed), national adult reading test full score (NART-FS) and personal level of 
education (Ed) in patients and controls.
Group Age Parents_Ed NART-FS Ed
Patients Mean 52.7 11.5 100.2 13.7
SD 11 3.5 8.3 2.3
Controls Mean 52.7 11.4 108.5 14.5
SD 11.9 2.8 7.3 2.4
TABLE 2 | Group differences in the percent of correct recognition of sentences 
that were agency (S/O) or spatially (IS-ES) coded and those that were not agency 
or spatially coded (NC).
Coding Mean Mean Std. Error Sig.
pt ctl Dif.
S/O distinction S/O coded 71.2 83.2 4 .004
NC 92.4 94.2 2.6 .5
IS/ES distinction IS-ES coded 59.3 69.3 4.2 .02
NC 96 96.2 2 .9
The mean of percent of accurate responses in patients (pt) was significantly lower from 
that of controls (ctl) for agency and spatially coded sentences (bold font) but not for 
sentences that were not agency or spatially coded.
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(Table 5, Figure 4B); and control variables (S–O and O–S 
misattribution biases) were not significant. Interestingly, mean 
S–O misattribution bias was 0.31 in the IS-AVH subgroup and 
0.13 in the ES-AVH subgroup reaching a trend for significance 
p < 0.08. This trend is consistent with the independence of agency 
and spatial processes.
DISCUSSION
The present study suggests that in health and disease, agency and 
spatial experiences of inner speech are related to independent 
operations; and, as such, these operations independently fail in 
disease—patients with AVH—resulting in agency and spatial 
externalizations of inner verbal thoughts, respectively.
At a cognitive level in both groups, agency externalization 
(S–O bias) was highly independent from spatial 
externalization (IS–ES bias) and the same relationship was 
found between agency and spatial internalizations (O–S and 
ES–IS biases, respectively). Furthermore, consistent with 
our previous work (8), the agency and spatial experiences of 
AVH were independent from one another. Moreover, the 
phenomenological and cognitive levels of agency and spatial 
externalizations were co-related. S–O bias, but not O–S bias, 
was significantly higher in patients with O-AVH relative to 
patients with S-AVH; and, similarly, IS–ES bias, but not ES–
IS bias, was significantly higher in patients with ES-AVH 
relative to patients with IS-AVH. Of further importance, 
spatial distinction failures (IS–ES and ES–IS biases) did not 
differentiate patient subgroups defined based on agency 
experiences of AVH (S-AVH and O-AVH); and, similarly, 
agency distinction failures (S–O and O–S biases) did not 
differentiate patient subgroups defined based on spatial 
experiences of AVH (IS-AVH and ES-AVH). This is a further 
indication that cognitive agency and spatial externalizations 
are directly related to the respective agency and special 
experiences of AVH, rather than ubiquitous deficits.
TABLE 3 | Results of linear regression analyses using misattribution error scores (A) and misattribution bias scores (B).
A Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients
Beta Std. Error Beta t p
S–O errors vs. IS–ES errors 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.11 0.92
Group X S–O errors vs. IS–ES errors 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.98
O–S errors vs. ES–IS errors 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.26 0.80
Group X O–S errors vs. ES–IS errors −0.01 0.06 −0.03 −0.18 0.86
B   
 Beta Std0. Error Beta t p
S–O Bias vs. IS/ES Bias −0.14 0.25 −0.09 −0.57 0.57
Group X S–O Bias vs. IS–ES Bias 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.79 0.44
O–S Bias vs. ES–IS Bias −0.05 0.08 −0.09 −0.57 0.55
Group X O–S Bias vs. ES–IS Bias 0.08 0.08 0.16 10.1 0.29
S, Self; O, Other; IS, internal space; ES, external space.
FIGURE 2 | The relationship between self–other misattribution errors (S–O errors) and internal space–external space misattribution errors (IS–ES errors) 
(A), and between other–self misattribution errors (O–S errors) and external space–internal space misattribution errors (ES–IS errors) (B).
Agency and Spatial Externalizations in HallucinationsStephane
7 September 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 668Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org
Multiple neural deficits as abnormal inner speech agency 
due to a corollary discharge deficit (11), heightened top 
down information processing (40) and impaired selective 
attention and context memory (41, 42) have been reported 
in subjects with AVH. However, it is generally accepted that 
any given deficit fails short of accounting for the wide range 
of the phenomenological diversity of AVH experiences (43). 
For example, Hunter (44) accurately argued that abnormal 
inner speech agency does not explain ES experience of inner 
speech. Previously, it was suggested that subject-specific 
combinatoric associations of multiple neural deficits could 
explain AVH experiences variable across subjects (28, 
45); and the present data support this theory. Specifically, 
the presence/absence of cognitive agency externalization, 
cognitive spatial externalization, or both determines the types 
of hallucinatory experience: hearing the “voices” of others 
in IS, hearing the “voices” of others in ES, hearing one’s own 
“voice” in IS or hearing one’s “voice” in ES. The data also 
show that in some patients, hallucination instances could be 
either S-AVH or O-AVH, and similarly alternate IS-AVH and 
ES-AVH instances are also noted. This likely reflects a milder 
degree of impairments of S/O and IS/ES distinction in these 
patients relative to those with exclusively O-AVH and IS-AVH 
experiences, respectively. Such account is suggested by current 
knowledge of the neural dysfunctions in schizophrenia. The 
literature point to abnormalities such as dysconnectivity and 
abnormal laterality (13, 14), which usually result in inefficient 
operations (here S/O and IS/ES distinction) rather than 
complete cessation of these operations.
To my knowledge, there is no prior similar line of inquiry 
or similar findings in the literature. However, the findings of 
this study are consistent with AVH imaging research and with 
the neuroscience of the experience of the self. AVH imaging 
has shown distinct neural bases for phenomenological and 
cognitive agency and spatial externalizations. In one study, the 
morphology of brain structures implicated in S/O distinction—
the temporoparietal Junction (TPJ) and the inferior parietal 
lobule—were dependent on S-AVH or O-AVH subtypes (46). 
Whereas patient with S-AVH had a morphology similar to that of 
healthy subjects (Steinmetz type 1 morphology) (47), patient with 
O-AVH did not. In another study, it was shown that white matter 
volume of the right TPJ was higher in patients with IS-AVH 
relative to both patients with ES-AVH and healthy controls (48). 
Moreover, during hallucinations, IS-AVH relative to ES-AVH 
were associated with higher activity in the left planum temporal 
and right middle frontal gyrus (49). Furthermore, our group 
has recently investigated neural activity associated with the 
operations of S/O agency and IS/ES distinction. We have shown 
that whereas higher activity of midline structures implicated in 
S/O distinction was observed in other-generated speech relative 
to self-generated speech in controls, the inverse was the case in 
hallucinating patients, which suggests propensity for S/O agency 
tags reversal during inner speech in AVH (50). with respect to 
IS/ES distinction, patients relative to controls have shown higher 
activity in the precuneus, a component of the “where” auditory 
pathway that is also involved in spatial imagery, during IS speech 
percepts relative to both rest and ES speech percepts. This 
suggests that IS speech percepts could be at times processed as 
ES percepts in AVH (51).
A common trend in AVH research is to consider inner speech 
externalization as a unitary phenomenon that reflect a deficit in 
source-memory (also referred to as self-monitoring, or reality-
monitoring). The latter, reality monitoring, appears to equate 
external reality with reality and to imply that internal reality 
(subjective experience) is unreal. As such, this terminology 
FIGURE 3 | The relationship between self–other misattribution bias (S–O bias) and internal space–external space misattribution bias (IS–ES bias) (A), and between 
other–self misattribution bias (O–S bias) and external space–internal space misattribution bias (ES–IS bias) (B).
TABLE 4 | Associations between agency and spatial experiences of AVH.  
Chi square did not rule of the null hypothesis of no associations at a p > 0.28. 
Also note S-AVH are more likely to be experienced in external space.
Spatial experience
ES-AVH IS-AVH Total
Agency experience O-AVH 7 8 15
S-AVH 5 2 7
Total 12 10 22
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may not be an accurate description of the underlying issue in 
AVH—a mismatch between internal and external realities. While 
self or source monitoring deficit could accurately describe the 
underlying neural dysfunction in AVH, the present data suggest 
that the scope of the monitoring deficit in AVH involves more 
than inner speech agency, it also involves inner space experience 
of inner speech. Moreover, our recent imaging research showed 
that neural abnormalities in AVH patients was associated with the 
actual agency and spatial experiences of inner speech, not with 
the memory of these experiences (the recall of who spoke or of 
where the voice was coming form) (50, 51). These considerations 
suggest that AVH could be understood as abnormal experiences 
of the self.
From a Cartesian perspective, the subjective experience of 
the self is immune to error (52). One may be wrong about what 
one thinks about the world but one is never wrong about the 
fact that one thinks what he/she thinks; that is: if I think an 
apple is green, I can be wrong about the color of the apple but 
I cannot be wrong about the fact that I think an apple is green. 
AVH, as inner speech generation disorders, challenge this 
philosophical perspective in multiple ways; that is: I thought of 
something but it is not me who was thinking and the thoughts 
seem outside of my head, let aside I am hearing, not thinking 
and many other aspects of hallucinations. This discrepancy 
appears to stem from the difference between one’s self and one’s 
brain; and AVH are not the only brain disorder that violates the 
Cartesian perspective of the self.
In patients with non-dominant hemisphere strokes, the paralyzed 
hemi-body is often considered as alien (53); and in epilepsy patients 
(54) as well as with stimulation of the temporoparietal junction 
(55), out-of-body experiences are reported. In these instances, 
not unlike AVH, there appears to be a dissociation between the 
experiences of self-agency and internal space/one’s body. Although, 
in other symptoms of psychosis such as thought insertion (56) and 
passivity symptoms (57), there appears to be concomitant disorders 
of agency and internal space. It should be noted that the multiplicity 
of domains of the experience of self has been conceptualized 
since William James (23); and self-domain specific impairments 
in schizophrenia—reduced Ichheit (first-person givenness) and 
Meinhaftigkeit (mineness)—have been described by Kurt Schneider 
[cited by Parnas and Henriksen (58)]. Furthermore, recent 
neuroscience research, echoing William James, points to multiple 
self domains (such as minimal self, embodied self, narrative self, 
agency and ownership) (59–62), and to domain-specific brain 
activity (24, 63).
Limitations and Suggestions for Future 
Research
It should be noted that this study is based on a small sample, 
and does not address intermediate AVH phenotypes (those 
TABLE 5 | Comparison of S–O and O–S misattribution biases between subgroups of patients defined according to AVH phenomenology: O-AVH, S-AVH (upper panel). 
Comparison of IS–ES and ES–IS misattribution biases between subgroups of patients defined according to AVH phenomenology: IS-AVH, ES-AVH (upper panel).
– AVH experience N Mean Std. deviation Std. error mean
S–O misattribution bias* O-AVH 16 0.28 0.25 0.06
S-AVH 8 0.11 0.13 0.05
O–S misattribution bias O-AVH 16 0.08 0.09 0.02
S-AVH 8 0.09 0.08 0.03
IS–ES misattribution bias* ES-AVH 12 0.30 0.14 0.04
IS-AVH 11 0.20 0.09 0.02
ES–IS misattribution bias ES-AVH 12 0.35 0.20 0.05
IS-AVH 11 0.34 0.15 0.04
S, Self; O, Other; IS, internal space; ES, external space. *and bold font indicate significance.
FIGURE 4 | (A) Differences in self–other (S–O)—red lines—and other–self (O–S)—blue lines—misattribution bias between subgroups of patients defined according 
to the agency experience of AVH: “voices” experienced as those of Self (S-AVH), and “voices” experienced as those of Other (O-AVH)). Only S–O bias difference 
was significant. (B) Differences in internal space–external space (IS–ES)—red lines—and external space–internal space (ES–IS)—blue lines—misattribution bias 
between subgroups of patients defined according to the spatial experience of AVH: “voices” experienced in internal space (IS-AVH), and “voices” experienced in 
external space (ES-AVH)). Only IS–ES bias was significant. *denote significance.
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with alternate S-AVH and O-AVH, and alternate IS-AVH and 
ES-AVH). Therefore, studies with larger number of subjects 
would be needed for replication and finer phenomenological 
subtyping of AVH. Furthermore, AVH are frequent in 
schizophrenia but are not limited to this illness. It is unclear 
whether the present findings would generalize to AVH in 
other psychiatric, medical, or general populations. The 
present study could be considered as a proof of concept 
that AVH phenomenology informs about the underlying 
cognitive, and possibly neural, impairments. As such, future 
cross-diagnostic and phenomenology informed AVH research 
could result in better understanding of AVH mechanisms as 
well as personalized treatment of these symptoms.
CONCLUSION
The present study suggests that agency and spatial externalizations 
of inner verbal thoughts are not ubiquitous or synonymous in 
AVH. Phenomenological agency externalization (hearing “voices” 
of other) appears to result from cognitive agency externalization 
(S-O bias) and phenomenological spatial externalization 
(hearing “voices” outside the head) appears to result from 
cognitive spatial externalization (IS/ES bias). Furthermore, both 
types of externalization could be understood in the wider context 
of abnormal experiences of the self. These considerations suggest 
need to disambiguate these externalizations from one another 
in brain level research of AVH mechanisms. It also suggests that 
cognitive remediation targeting agency and spatial distinction 
impairments as well as metacognitive integration of self domains 
might be effective treatment for AVH.
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